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This paper proposes a novel method for conducting policy analysis with potentially
misspeciﬁed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and applies it to
a New Keynesian DSGE model along the lines of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(JPE 2005) and Smets and Wouters (JEEA 2003). Speciﬁcally, we are studying the
eﬀects of coeﬃcient changes in interest-rate feedback rules on the volatility of output
to assumptions on the policy invariance of model misspeciﬁcations.
Key Words: Bayesian Analysis, DSGE Models, Model Misspeciﬁcation
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April 2005Non-Technical Summary
Despite recent successes in improving the empirical performance of dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models, e.g., Frank Smets and Raf Wouters (JEEA 2003), even
large-scale DSGE models su®er to some extent from misspeci¯cation. By misspeci¯cation
we mean that the DSGE model potentially imposes invalid cross-coe±cient restrictions on
the moving-average representation of the macroeconomic time series that it aims to explain.
One typically observes that the forecasting performance of DSGE models is worse than
that of vector autoregressions (VARs) estimated with well-calibrated shrinkage methods.
On the other hand, DSGE models have the advantage that one can explicitly assess the
e®ect of policy regime changes on expectation formation and decision rules of private agents.
Thus, policy analysis with DSGE models is robust to the Lucas critique and potentially more
reliable than conclusions drawn from VARs. This trade-o® poses a challenge to policymakers
who want to use DSGE models in practice.
Our paper proposes a novel method for conducting policy analysis with potentially
misspeci¯ed DSGE models. DSGE model restrictions are neither completely ignored as
in the unrestricted estimation of VARs, nor are they dogmatically imposed as in the direct
estimation of DSGE models. We allow for discrepancies between the data generating process
and the DSGE model. We specify a prior distribution over the discrepancies with the
property that large deviations have low probability, capturing the notion that DSGE models
are good albeit not perfect approximations of reality.
Our framework can be viewed as a Bayesian alternative to the robust control and mini-
max approaches that recently have been proposed to cope with model misspeci¯cation (see,
for instance the monograph by Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent (2005) and the papers in
the February 2002 special issue of Macroeconomic Dynamics). In our setup, the policymaker
can learn from past observations about the extent of the DSGE model misspeci¯cation, and
adjust her policies accordingly. We propose a variety of procedures that di®er with respect
to the assumptions about the policy invariance of model misspeci¯cations.
We study the e®ects of changing coe±cients in an interest-rate feedback rule on the
volatility of in°ation, output growth, and nominal interest rates by considering a large-scale
DSGE model with capital accumulation as well as various nominal and real frictions along
the lines of Frank Smets' and Raf Wouters' (JEEA 2003) model. We illustrate how con-
clusions about the e®ects of changing the response to in°ation are a®ected by assumptions
about the policy invariance of observed discrepancies between model and reality.
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April 2005While the particular values of the posterior expected loss di®erentials are sensitive to
the misspeci¯cation assumptions considered, a fairly robust policy recommendation emerges
from our analysis: the central bank should avoid strong responses to output growth move-
ments and not react weakly to in°ation °uctuations.
6
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Despite recent successes in improving the empirical performance of dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003), even large-scale DSGE
models suﬀer to some extent from misspeciﬁcation. In this paper misspeciﬁcation means
that the DSGE model potentially imposes invalid cross-coeﬃcient restrictions on the moving-
average representation of the macroeconomic time series that it aims to explain. As a con-
sequence, one typically observes that the forecasting performance of DSGE models is worse
than that of vector autoregressions (VARs) estimated with well-calibrated shrinkage meth-
ods. On the other hand, DSGE models have the advantage that one can explicitly assess
the eﬀect of policy regime changes on expectation formation and decision rules of private
agents. Thus, policy analysis with DSGE models is robust to the Lucas critique and poten-
tially more reliable than conclusions drawn from VARs. This trade-oﬀ poses a challenge to
policymakers who want to use DSGE models in practice.
Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) proposed a framework that combines VARs and DSGE
models, extending earlier work by Ingram and Whiteman (1994). In this framework DSGE
model restrictions are neither completely ignored as in the unrestricted estimation of VARs,
nor are they dogmatically imposed as in the direct estimation of DSGE models. Instead
the VAR estimates are tilted toward the restrictions implied by the DSGE model, where
the degree of tilting is determined by a Bayesian data-driven procedure that trades oﬀ
model ﬁt against complexity. Starting from the same DSGE model that is used in this
paper, Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004) show that relaxing the DSGE
model restrictions leads to a substantial improvement of in-sample-ﬁt (adjusted for model
complexity) and more accurate pseudo-out-of-sample predictions.
This paper extends our earlier work and further develops procedures that are suitable to
study the eﬀects of rare regime shifts with potentially misspeciﬁed DSGE models. Monetary
policy is modelled through an interest-rate feedback rule. While our earlier work relaxes all
DSGE model restrictions simultaneously, this paper assumes that the monetary policy rule
in the DSGE model is correctly speciﬁed and strictly imposes the associated restrictions.
We consider the following policy experiment. Between time t = T and t = T + 1 the
monetary policy maker seeks to replace an existing interest-rate feedback rule with one that
minimizes her loss function. We make the simplifying assumption that the public believes
the new policy to be in place indeﬁnitely after being announced credibly. The loss function
is deﬁned in terms of expected squared deviations of output growth, inﬂation, and interest
7
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distribution on the parameters that characterize the misspeciﬁcation of the DSGE model
restrictions and subsequently updates this prior based on time T information. We then
consider a variety of assumptions on the policy invariance of the misspeciﬁcation parameters
and calculate posterior expected losses as a function of the policy parameters.
A key feature of our analysis is that we treat model misspeciﬁcation as non-structured.
By “non-structured” we mean the following: Once the restrictions derived from the DSGE
model are relaxed there is no formal interpretation of the resulting speciﬁcation in terms
of a fully speciﬁed general equilibrium model. We view this analysis as a complement to
a structured misspeciﬁcation analysis in which model misspeciﬁcation is phrased in terms
of omitted or wrongly speciﬁed structural components, such as, for instance, omitted capi-
tal adjustment costs or the use of Calvo-style nominal rigidities instead of state-dependent
pricing rules. The DSGE model analyzed in this paper is based on work by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2002), and
Smets and Wouters (2003). Compared to the benchmark New Keynesian models discussed,
for instance, in Woodford (2003), our model has been subjected to a number of modiﬁca-
tions, all designed to improve its empirical ﬁt. Nevertheless, as documented in Del Negro,
Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004) misspeciﬁcation is still a concern and we believe
that this concern should be reﬂected in policy recommendations derived from this model.1
The procedures developed in this paper can be viewed as a Bayesian alternative to ro-
bust control and minimax approaches that recently have been proposed to cope with model
misspeciﬁcation, e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2005), Giannoni (2002), Levin, Wieland, and
Williams (1999), and Onatski and Stock (2002). Rather than placing a prior distribution on
the misspeciﬁcation parameters, the robustness literature speciﬁes either a static or dynamic
two-player zero-sum game in which a malevolent “nature” chooses the misspeciﬁcation pa-
rameters to harm the policy maker. The disadvantage of this approach is that the resulting
policy performs well in the worst-case but possibly poorly on average. In our setup, un-
like in most formulations of minimax problems, the policy maker uses the data to learn
about the model misspeciﬁcation. To compare our analysis to a risk-sensitive approach, we
compute posterior expected losses for an exponential transformation of our loss function.
The resulting risk can be interpreted as the Nash-equilibrium of a zero-sum game in which
“nature” distorts the probability distribution of the misspeciﬁcation parameters subject to
1In Del Negro and Schorfheide (2005) we applied the approach developed in this paper to a simple
three-equation New Keynesian model without capital accumulation and wage rigidities.
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non-distorted probabilities.
The empirical analysis is based on quarterly U.S. output, inﬂation, and interest data
from 1983 to 2004. We estimate the state-space representation of the log-linearized DSGE
model and its vector autoregressive approximation. The estimation is implemented with
a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm that allows us to generate draws from the joint
posterior distribution of the DSGE model and the misspeciﬁcation parameters. We then
compute expected policy loss diﬀerentials relative to the estimated interest rate feedback
rule. We consider four scenarios that diﬀer with respect to assumptions on the eﬀect of
policy changes on the beliefs about model misspeciﬁcation. The ﬁrst scenario – used as a
benchmark – simply ignores misspeciﬁcation, and computes the loss assuming the DSGE
model correctly describes the data. The second scenario assumes that the policy maker
is willing to learn from historical data about the overall degree of model misspeciﬁcation,
but not about its precise nature. In computing the expected loss from a given policy she
therefore draws the misspeciﬁcation parameters from her prior distribution. When coupled
with the risk-sensitive transformation of the loss function, policy analysis under this scenario
is close in spirit to that obtained under robust control. In the remaining two scenarios the
policy maker learns from the data about the misspeciﬁcation parameters, that is, uses the
posterior distribution of the misspeciﬁcation parameters in computing the loss. In the third
scenario the policy maker assumes that misspeciﬁcation is policy invariant, while in the forth
scenario she uses the conditional distribution of the misspeciﬁcation and policy parameters
to condition the posterior distribution of the misspeciﬁcation parameters on the new policy
parameters.
We ﬁnd that the the particular values of the loss diﬀerentials are sensitive to the mis-
speciﬁcation assumptions considered. Both the risks and the gains associated with deviating
from the historical Volcker-Greenspan policy are very diﬀerent depending on the assump-
tions on misspeciﬁcation. Also, risks and gains diﬀer whether the policy maker uses the
risk-neutral or the risk-sensitive approach. However, a fairly robust policy recommendation
emerges from our analysis: the central bank should avoid strong responses to output growth
movements and not react weakly to inﬂation ﬂuctuations. Also, we ﬁnd that the gains asso-
ciated with deviating from the historical Volcker-Greenspan policy, whenever positive, are
generally not very large. This suggests that the historical rule, if not always optimal among
those we consider, has been reasonably good at least from the perspective of this sticky-
prices DSGE model, even taking misspeciﬁcation into account. A caveat to this conclusion
9
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as opposed to a more general class of policies.
The paper is organized as follows. The DSGE model is presented in Section 2. Section 3
discusses the estimation of potentially misspeciﬁed DSGE models. The framework for policy
analysis is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data set, Section 6 discusses
our empirical ﬁndings, and Section 7 concludes. The posterior simulator that is used to
implement the empirical analysis is described in the Appendix.
2 Model
This section describes the DSGE model, which is a slightly modiﬁed version of the DSGE
model developed and estimated for the Euro area in Smets and Wouters (2003). In particu-
lar, we introduce stochastic trends into the model, so that it can be ﬁtted to unﬁltered time
series observations. The DSGE model, largely based on the work of Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005), contains a large number of nominal and real frictions. Next, we
describe each of the agents that populate the model economy and the decision problems
they face.
2.1 Final goods producers
The ﬁnal good Yt is a composite made of a continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i), indexed









The ﬁnal goods producers are perfectly competitive ﬁrms that buy intermediate goods,





subject to (1). Here Pt denotes the price of the ﬁnal good and Pt(i) is the price of inter-
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where the technology shock Zt (common across all ﬁrms) follows a unit root process. We
deﬁne technology growth zt = log(Zt=Zt¡1) and assume that zt follows the autoregressive
process:
(zt ¡ °) = ½z(zt¡1 ¡ °) + ¾z²z;t: (4)
All ﬁrms face the same prices for their inputs, labor and capital. Hence cost minimization










where Wt is the nominal wage and Rk
t is the rental rate of capital. Following Calvo (1983)
we assume that in every period a fraction of ﬁrms ³p is unable to re-optimize their prices
Pt(i). These ﬁrms adjust their prices mechanically according to
Pt(i) = (¼t¡1)¶p(¼¤)1¡¶p; (6)
where ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 and ¼¤ is the steady state inﬂation rate of the ﬁnal good. In our
empirical analysis we will restrict ¶p to be either zero or one. Those ﬁrms that are able to
re-optimize prices choose the price level ˜ Pt(i) that solves:



















































t+s is today’s value of a future dollar for the consumers and MCt reﬂects marginal
costs. We consider only the symmetric equilibrium where all ﬁrms will choose the same ˜ Pt(i).
Hence from (2) we obtain the following law of motion for the aggregate price level:











There is a continuum of households, indexed by j 2 [0;1], each supplying a diﬀerentiated
form of labor, L(j). The “labor packers” are perfectly competitive ﬁrms that hire labor
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where ¸w 2 (0;1). From ﬁrst-order and zero-proﬁt conditions of the labor packers we obtain



































where Ct(j) is consumption, Lt(j) is labor supply, and Mt(j) are money holdings. House-
hold’s preferences display habit-persistence. We depart from Smets and Wouters (2003) in
assuming separability in the utility function for a reason that will be discussed later. Real
money balances enter the utility function deﬂated by the (stochastic) trend growth of the
economy, so to make real money demand stationary.
The household’s budget constraint written in nominal terms is given by:
Pt+sCt+s(j) + Pt+sIt+s(j) + Bt+s(j) + Mt+s(j) · Rt+sBt+s¡1(j) + Mt+s¡1(j)
+ Πt+s + Wt+s(j)Lt+s(j) +
¡
Rk




where It(j) is investment, Bt(j) is holdings of government bonds, Rt is the gross nominal
interest rate paid on government bonds, Πt is the per-capita proﬁt the household gets from
owning ﬁrms (households pool their ﬁrm shares, and they all receive the same proﬁt), and
Wt(j) is the nominal wage earned by household j. The term within parenthesis represents
the return to owning ¯ Kt(j) units of capital. Households choose the utilization rate of their
own capital, ut(j). Households rent to ﬁrms in period t an amount of “eﬀective” capital
equal to:
Kt(j) = ut(j) ¯ Kt¡1(j); (13)
and receive Rk
tut(j) ¯ Kt¡1(j) in return. They however have to pay a cost of utilization in
terms of the consumption good equal to a(ut(j)) ¯ Kt¡1(j). Households accumulate capital
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where ± is the rate of depreciation, and S(¢) is the cost of adjusting investment, with
S0(¢) > 0;S00(¢) > 0.
The households’ wage setting is subject to nominal rigidities ´ a la Calvo (1983). In
each period a fraction ³w of households is unable to re-adjust wages. For these households,
the wage Wt(j) will increase at a geometrically weighted average of the steady state rate
increase in wages (equal to steady state inﬂation ¼¤ times the growth rate of the economy
e°) and of last period’s inﬂation times last period’s productivity (¼t¡1ezt¡1). The weights
are 1 ¡ ¶w and ¶w, respectively. Those households that are able to re-optimize their wage
solve the problem:

















We again consider only the symmetric equilibrium in which all agents solving (15) will
choose the same ˜ Wt(j). From (10b) it follows that:








Finally, we assume there is a complete set of state contingent securities in nominal
terms, which implies that the Lagrange multiplier Ξ
p
t(j) associated with (12) must be the
same for all households in all periods and across all states of the world. This in turn implies
that in equilibrium households will make the same choice of consumption, money demand,
investment and capital utilization. Since the amount of leisure will diﬀer across households
due to the wage rigidity, separability between labor and consumption in the utility function
is key for this result.
2.5 Government policies
The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule by adjusting its instrument in response
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t is the target level of output, and the parameter
½R determines the degree of interest rate smoothing. In our formulation of the policy rule,
the central bank responds to output growth rather than some measure of the output gap.
The government budget constraint is of the form
PtGt + Rt¡1Bt¡1 + Mt¡1 = Tt + Mt + Bt; (18)
where Tt are nominal lump-sum taxes (or subsidies) that also appear in household’s budget
constraint. Government spending is given by:
Gt = (1 ¡ 1=gt)Yt; (19)
where gt follows the process:
lngt = (1 ¡ ½g)lng + ½g lngt¡1 + ¾g²g;t (20)
2.6 Resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint:




can be derived by integrating the budget constraint (12) across households, and combining
it with the government budget constraint (18) and the zero proﬁt conditions of both labor
packers and ﬁnal good producers.
2.7 Model solution and State-Space Representation
As in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2002) our model economy evolves along
stochastic growth path. Output Yt, consumption Ct, investment It, the real wage Wt=Pt,
physical capital Kt and eﬀective capital ¯ Kt all grow at the rate Zt. Nominal interest
rates, inﬂation, and hours worked are stationary. The model can be rewritten in terms
of detrended variables. We ﬁnd the steady states for the detrended variables and use the
method in Sims (2002) to construct a log-linear approximation of the model around the
steady state.
Our empirical analysis is based on data on nominal interest rates (annualized), inﬂation
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given by the following measurement equations:
y1;t = lnr¤
a + ln¼¤




a + 4e ¼t
ln° + ∆e xt + e zt
3
5:
Here, y1;t denotes the policy-maker’s instrument (the interest rate), and y2;t is a vector
that includes the remaining two endogenous variables. We collect all the DSGE model
parameters in the vector µ and stack the structural shocks in the vector ²t.
3 Setup and Inference
In the subsequent analysis it is assumed that the DSGE model generates a covariance-
stationary distribution of the sequence fytg for all µ 2 Θ. Expectations under this dis-
tribution are denoted by I E
D
µ [¢]. We will derive an (approximate) vector autoregressive
representation for the DSGE model and introduce model misspeciﬁcations as deviations
from this representation.2 Unlike in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) and Del Negro,
Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004), we assume that the interest rate feedback rule in
the DSGE model is correctly speciﬁed and do not relax the restriction generated by the
policy rule. Finally, a prior distribution for these model misspeciﬁcations is speciﬁed and
posterior inference and policy analysis are discussed.
3.1 A VAR Representation of the DSGE Model




2;tM2¯2(µ) + ²1;t; (23)
where yt = [y1;t;y0
2;t]0 and the k£1 vector xt = [y0
t¡1;:::;y0
t¡p;1]0 is composed of the ﬁrst p
lags of yt and an intercept. The shock ²1;t corresponds to the monetary policy shock ¾R²R;t
in the DSGE model. The matrices M1 and M2 select the appropriate elements of xt and y2;t
to generate the policy rule. In our application the vector M1 selects the intercept and the
lagged nominal interest rate and the matrix M2 extracts inﬂation, and output growth. The
2We are working with vector autoregressive approximations rather than with state-space models to
simplify the simulation of the posterior distributions.
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April 2005functions ¯1(µ) and ¯2(µ) can be easily derived from (17) and the measurement equation (22)
for Rt.





In general, the VAR representation (24) is not exact if the number of lags p is ﬁnite. We
deﬁne ΓXX(µ) = I E
D
µ [xtx0







Since the system is covariance stationary, the VAR approximation of the autocovariance
sequence of y2;t can be made arbitrarily precise by increasing the number of lags p. If
in addition, the moving-average (MA) representation of the DSGE model in terms of the
structural shocks ²t is invertible, then u2;t can also be expressed as a function of ²t for large
p. Conditions for invertibility and results on the accuracy of this VAR approximation can
be found in Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2004).




tΨ¤(µ)M2¯2(µ) + u1;t; (26)
where u1;t = u0
2;tM2¯2(µ) + ²1;t. Deﬁne u0
t = [u1;t;u0
2;t], B1(µ) = [M1¯1(µ);0k£(n¡1)],
B2(µ) = [M2¯2(µ);I(n¡1)£(n¡1)], and let
Φ¤(µ) = B1(µ) + Ψ¤(µ)B2(µ): (27)





t] = Σ¤(µ) (28)
with
Φ = Φ¤(µ); Σ = Σ¤(µ) = ΓY Y (µ) ¡ ΓY X(µ)Γ
¡1
XX(µ)ΓXY (µ):
Here the population covariance matrices are ΓY Y (µ) = I E
D
µ [yty0





t]. The following Lemma will be useful for the subsequent analysis and can be
veriﬁed by straightforward matrix manipulations. Let I E
V AR
Ψ;Σ [¢] denote expectations under
the probability distribution generated by (28).
Lemma 1 (i) The VAR coeﬃcient matrix Φ¤(µ) = Γ
¡1
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exactly reproduced by the VAR, see Eq. (23), Φ¤(µ) equals the population least squares
coeﬃcients associated with (28), and the covariance matrix of xt under the DSGE model
and its VAR approximation are identical. For the ease of exposition we will subsequently
ignore the error made by approximating the state space representation of the DSGE model
with the ﬁnite-order VAR or, in other words, treat (28) as the structural model that imposes
– potentially misspeciﬁed – cross-equation restrictions on the matrices Φ and Σ.
3.2 Misspeciﬁcation and Bayesian Inference
We make the following assumptions about misspeciﬁcation of the DSGE model. There is
a vector µ and matrices Ψ∆ and Σ∆ such that the data are generated from the VAR in
Eq. (28)
Φ = B1(µ) + (Ψ¤(µ) + Ψ∆)B2(µ); Σ = Σ¤(µ) + Σ∆ (29)
and there does not exist a ˜ µ 2 Θ such that
Φ = B1(˜ µ) + Ψ¤(˜ µ)B2(˜ µ); Σ = Σ¤(˜ µ):
We refer to the resulting speciﬁcation as DSGE-VAR. A stylized graphical representation of
our notion of misspeciﬁcation can be found in Figure 1. Our econometric analysis is casted
in a Bayesian framework in which initial beliefs about the DSGE model parameter µ and
the model misspeciﬁcation matrices Ψ∆ and Σ∆ are summarized in a prior distribution.
In order to compare the Bayesian approach to model misspeciﬁcation pursed in this paper
to minimax and robust control approaches, the reader might ﬁnd it helpful to think of
a ﬁctitious other, “nature”, that draws the misspeciﬁcation matrices Ψ∆ and Σ∆ from a
distribution – the prior – rather than maximizing the loss function to harm the policy maker.
The remainder of this section describes the choice of this prior.
Our prior is based on the idea that “nature” is more likely to draw smaller than larger
misspeciﬁcation matrices, reﬂecting the belief that the DSGE model provides a good albeit
not perfect approximation of reality. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the prior density decreases
the larger the size of the discrepancies Ψ∆ and Σ∆. In the spirit of Hansen and Sargent’s
(2005) approach to model misspeciﬁcation and robust control, the size of the discrepancies
is determined by the ease with which they can be detected via likelihood ratios. This metric
determines the shape of the prior contours (see Figure 1). The mass placed on these contours
is determined by the parameter ¸. Large values of ¸ imply that large discrepancies are less
17
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April 2005likely to occur. Hence, the parameter ¸ measures the overall degree of misspeciﬁcation. We
will now further motivate and explain the prior distribution using a thought experiment,
where for ease of exposition we set Σ∆ = 0 and ﬁx the DSGE model parameter vector µ.
Suppose that a sample of ¸T observations is generated from the DSGE model (that is,
from equation (28), where Φ = Φ¤). Suppose that you use these observations to tell the
DSGE (Ψ = Ψ¤) and the misspeciﬁed model (Ψ = Ψ¤ +Ψ∆) apart using a likelihood ratio.
Since the likelihood ratio is decreasing in the number of observations ¸T for ﬁxed Ψ∆, the



























2(Ψ¤ + (¸T)¡1=2e Ψ∆)0X0X(Ψ¤ + (¸T)¡1=2e Ψ∆)B2
+2B0
2(Ψ¤ + (¸T)¡1=2e Ψ∆)0X0(Y ¡ XB1)
¶¸
:
Here Y denotes the ¸T £ n matrix with rows y0
t and Xt is the ¸T £ k matrix with rows x0
t.






















Taking expectations over X and U using the distribution induced by the data generating
process yields (minus) the Kullback-Leibler distance between the data generating process






















Here we have used Lemma 1(ii). We choose a prior density for Ψ∆ that is proportional (/)
















The hyperparameter ¸ determines the length of the hypothetical sample as a multiple of the
actual sample size T. This hyperparameter “scales” the overall degree of misspeciﬁcation.
For high values of ¸, it is easy to tell the misspeciﬁed model and the DSGE model apart
even for small values of the misspeciﬁcation Ψ∆. Hence the prior density places most of its
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misspeciﬁcation disappears altogether. On the contrary, if ¸ is close to zero the Kullback-
Leibler distance can be small even for relatively large values of the discrepancy Ψ∆. Hence
the prior is fairly diﬀuse. For computational reasons it is convenient to transform this prior











In practice we also have to take potential misspeciﬁcation of the covariance matrix
Σ¤(µ) into account. Hence, we will use the following, slightly modiﬁed, prior distribution















where IW denotes the inverted Wishart distribution. The latter induces a distribution for
the discrepancy Σ∆ = Σ ¡ Σ¤.
The Appendix provides a characterization of the following conditional posterior densi-
ties:
p(ΨjΣ;µ;Y ); p(ΣjΨ;µ;Y ); and p(µjΨ;Σ;Y ):
Unfortunately, it is not possible to give a characterization of all conditional distributions
in terms of well-known probability distributions. To implement the Gibbs sampler we have
to introduce two Metropolis steps that generate draws from the conditional distributions
p(ΣjΨ;µ;Y ) and p(µjΨ;Σ;Y ). The resulting Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) algo-
rithm is known as Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler and allows us to generate draws from
the joint posterior distribution of µ, Ψ, and Σ. In addition to the posterior distribution of




for various choices of the hyperparameter ¸ and restrictions on the parameter space of the
DSGE model. Based on the marginal data densities we can compute Bayes factors and
posterior probabilities for the various speciﬁcations of our model. Under the assumption of
equal prior probabilities, ratios of marginal likelihoods can be interpreted as model odds.
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Between time t = T and t = T +1 the policymaker seeks to replace the existing policy rule
with one that minimizes a loss function that will be deﬁned subsequently. We make the
simplifying assumption that the public believes the new policy to be in place indeﬁnitely
after being announced credibly. The policymaker does not exploit the fact that the public
has formed its time T expectations based on the T policy rule. This assumption is a short-
cut to a more realistic scenario in which there are two types of policy shifts - normal policy
making and rare regime shifts (using the terminology of Sims, 1982).
4.1 Loss Function
To simplify the exposition we begin by abstracting from parameter uncertainty. Suppose
that prior to the policy the economy operates according to the parameters µ0, Ψ∆
0 , and
Σ∆
0 . We assume that under this parameterization the VAR is non-explosive with long-run
mean ¯ y. Deﬁne e yt = yt ¡ ¯ y. Let f M be the (k ¡ 1) £ k matrix with zeros in the last
column and a (k ¡ 1) £ (k ¡ 1) identity matrix in the remaining columns. Moreover, deﬁne
e xt = [e yt¡1;:::; e yt¡p]0. Then the VAR can be rewritten in terms of deviations from the mean
as follows:
e y0
t = e x0
tf M[B1(µ) + (Ψ¤(µ) + Ψ∆)B2(µ)] + u0
t: (37)
We assume the mean ¯ y is invariant to changes in the policy parameters3 and that the policy
maker considers the following loss function








where the law of motion of ˜ y is given by (37). ± is a discount factor, µ is partitioned into
policy rule parameters µp and taste-and-technology parameters µs, and tr[¢] denotes the trace
operator. The expectation in (38) is taken conditional on post-intervention parameters µ,
Ψ∆, and Σ∆ and the pre-intervention observations e yT¡p+1;:::; e yT.
The loss function can be rewritten as





tr[WVT(e yt)] + tr[WI ET[e yt]I ET[e yt]0]
¶
: (39)
3This assumption is consistent with the DSGE model, in which the policy parameters Ã1, Ã2, and ½R do
not aﬀect steady state output growth, inﬂation, and interest rates.
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is well deﬁned, even if the post intervention VAR is explosive, as long as the horizon h is
ﬁnite or the reciprocal of the discount factor exceeds the largest eigenvalue of the vector
autoregressive system. Since the loss is obtained by taking a conditional expectation it
depends on the state of the economy in time T, summarized by e xT+1. To remove this
time dependence a common approach in the literature, see for instance Woodford (2003), is
to integrate over e xT+1 using the distribution implied by the VAR, provided the system is
stationary. Hence we deﬁne




= (1 ¡ ±h)tr[WV(e yT+1)]; (40)
where V(¢) is now the unconditional variance.
We truncate the loss function L at the level B. This truncation ensures that the expected
loss is well deﬁned, even if some of the parameter conﬁgurations in the support of the






4.2 Taking Misspeciﬁcation into Account
The policymaker minimizes the loss L(µp;µs;Ψ∆;Σ∆) as a function of the policy parameter
µp. She has imperfect knowledge about: (i) the policy invariant private sectors’ taste and
technology parameters µs; and (ii) the degree of model misspeciﬁcation captured by ¸, Ψ∆
and Σ∆. The uncertainty is summarized in the posterior distribution.
We consider four diﬀerent scenarios for the policy invariance of the misspeciﬁcation ma-
trices Φ∆ and Σ∆. Then we calculate the posterior expected loss associated with diﬀerent
policies according to each scenario. If the DSGE model does not suﬀer from serious mis-
speciﬁcation all scenarios collapse to Scenario 1. At this point we have no theory that lets
us determine which of the scenarios will provide the most accurate prediction of the policy
eﬀects. The goal of the subsequent empirical analysis is to illustrate the sensitivity of policy
predictions to assumptions on (un-structured) model misspeciﬁcation.
4Truncated losses are being used elsewhere in the literature, for instance, Brock, Durlauf, and West
(2004). In our empirical analysis (not reported in this paper) we also calculated posterior expected losses
for the loss function (1 ¡ ±)
PT+h
t=T+1 ±t¡T¡1tr[WVT(e yt)] for h = 80 (20 years) and ± = 0:99. Even though
the expected losses are strictly speaking ﬁnite, the posterior risk was greater than 1010 for those values of µp
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ignored. The policymaker does, however, take the uncertainty with respect to the non-policy
parameters into account when calculating the expected loss. This scenario dates back at
least to Brainard (1967) and serves as a benchmark. More recent examples in the context
of DSGE models include Laforte (2003) and Onatski and Williams (2004).
Scenario 2: The policymaker believes that the sample (hence the posterior) provides
no information about potential misspeciﬁcation after a regime shift has been implemented.
This skepticism about the relevance of sample information is shared by the robust control
approaches of Hansen and Sargent (2005) and Onatski and Stock (2002). Here, instead
of using a minimax argument, our Bayesian policymaker relies on her prior distribution
p(Ψ∆;Σ∆jµ;¸) to cope with uncertainty about model misspeciﬁcation. She still uses the
sample to learn about µs and ¸, however.
Scenario 3: Ψ∆ and Σ∆ are assumed to be invariant to changes in policy. The sample
information is used to learn about the model misspeciﬁcation via the posterior distribution.
Looking forward, the information is used to adjust the policy predictions derived from the
DSGE model. To implement the analysis, we generate draws from the marginal posterior
distribution of µs, Ψ∆, and Σ∆, combine ˜ µ = [˜ µ0
p;µ0
s]0, and calculate Ψ¤(˜ µ)+Ψ∆ and Σ¤(˜ µ)+
Σ∆. Here, ˜ µp is the new set of policy parameters. The choice of ˜ µp does not aﬀect beliefs
about the misspeciﬁcation matrices.
Scenario 4: “Nature” generates a new set of draws from the posterior distribution of Ψ∆
and Σ∆ conditional on the post-intervention DSGE model parameters ˜ µ. To implement the
risk calculation we take a draw from the marginal posterior distribution of µs, combine it with
the policy parameter to obtain ˜ µ = [˜ µ0
p;µ0
s]0, and generate a draw from p(Ψ∆;Σ∆jY T; ˜ µ;¸).
As before, we then calculate Ψ¤(˜ µ)+Ψ∆ and Σ¤(˜ µ)+Σ∆. In this scenario, the policy maker
revises her beliefs about the misspeciﬁcation matrix as she contemplates diﬀerent values of
the policy parameters. For small values of ¸ the conditional posterior distribution of Ψ and
Σ given µ is is eﬀectively insensitive to µ. In this case Scenario 4 corresponds to analyzing
policy eﬀects with a VAR by simply changing the coeﬃcients in the policy rule, ignoring
any changes in private-sector behavior that the policy shift might induce.
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So far, we placed a probability distribution over the misspeciﬁcation parameters and mini-
mized posterior expected loss. There is a growing literature in economics5 that studies the
robustness of decision rules to model misspeciﬁcation. Underlying this robustness analysis
is typically a static or dynamic two-person zero-sum game. The decision maker, in our
case the central bank, is minimizing her loss function while a malevolent ﬁctitious other,
“nature”, chooses the misspeciﬁcation to harm the decision maker. “Nature’s” choice, in
our notation Ψ∆ and Σ∆, is either limited to a bounded set or it is subject to a penalty
function that is increasing in the size of the misspeciﬁcation. The policy maker’s decision
is robust, if it corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in the two-person game.
In the Bayesian framework the risk sensitivity that is inherent in the robust control
approach can be introduced by transforming the loss function. Instead of minimizing the
expected value of L(µp;µs;Ψ∆;Σ∆), the policy maker is equipped with an exponential utility








where p(µs;Ψ∆;Σ∆) denotes the joint density of µs, Ψ∆, Σ∆. A positive ¿ makes the policy















The maximization with respect to q(¢) is subject to the constraints
Z
p(µs;Ψ∆;Σ∆)q(µs;Ψ∆;Σ∆)d(µs;Ψ∆;Σ∆) = 1; q(µs;Ψ∆;Σ∆) ¸ 0:
The interpretation of this game is that “nature” chooses the function q(¢) to distort the
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larger ¿, the larger the penalty for deviating from p(¢). The link between the exponential
transformation of the loss function and the zero-sum game representation was pointed out
by Jacobsen (1973) in one of the ﬁrst studies of optimization under a risk-sensitive criterion.
In the subsequent empirical analysis we will also compute posterior expected losses under
the four scenarios for the risk sensitive version of the policy problem. Hence, “nature” is not
only drawing misspeciﬁcation matrices Ψ∆ and Σ∆, but at the same time also distorting
the probabilities.6
5 The Data
In our empirical analysis we use observations on interest rates, inﬂation, and output growth.
All data are obtained from Haver Analytics (Haver mnemonics are in italics). Real output is
obtained by dividing the nominal series (GDP) by population 16 years and older (LF+LH),
and deﬂating using the chained-price GDP deﬂator (JGDP). Growth rates are computed
using log-diﬀerences from quarter to quarter, and are in percent. Inﬂation is computed
using log-diﬀerences of the GDP deﬂator, in percent. The nominal rate corresponds to the
eﬀective Federal Funds rate (FFED), also in percent. The results reported subsequently are
based on a sample from 1983:Q3 to 2004:Q1.
6 Empirical Application
The setup in the empirical application reﬂects some of the the ﬁndings contained in our
previous research. In Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets and Wouters (2004), henceforth DSSW,
we did not ﬁnd evidence in favor of price indexation. Therefore, we let ¶p = ¶w = 0. Unlike in
DSSW, we do not use observations on consumption and investment, which makes it diﬃcult
to identify the capital share and the depreciation rate. Therefore, we let ® = 0:25 and
± = 0:025. Since we are not extracting information from wage and money data we ﬁx the
wage-markup parameter ¸w = 0:3, and the money demand elasticity ºm = 2. In a log-linear
approximation the Calvo parameter is typically not separately identiﬁable from the price
6Strictly speaking only Ψ∆ and Σ∆ capture misspeciﬁcation. This suggests that one should integrate
out µs from L(µp;µs;Ψ∆;Σ∆) with respect to p(µsjµp;Ψ∆;Σ∆) prior to the exponential transformation.
However, this integration is numerically cumbersome and we decided to apply the notion of robustness not
only to the misspeciﬁcation parameters but also to µs.
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to endogenously generate persistence in real variables, we impose that technology growth
shocks are serially uncorrelated, that is, ½z = 0.
6.1 Model Estimation
We begin with a direct estimation of the state-space representation of the DSGE model
using Bayesian techniques described in Schorfheide (2000). Table 1 reports prior mean
and standard deviations, as well as posterior means and 90% probability intervals for the
structural parameters. The estimates for the inﬂation and output growth coeﬃcients in
the monetary policy rule are 1.43 and 0.36, respectively. Our estimate of the smoothing
coeﬃcient is fairly high compared to estimates reported elsewhere in the literature: ˆ ½r =
0:83. The Calvo parameters for wages and prices are 0.72, and 0.79, respectively. Thus,
agents change their prices on average every 4 quarters. We estimate a large degree of habit
persistence, whereas the data seem to be fairly uninformative with respect to the labor
supply elasticity ¹l and the cost of capital utilization a00.
We proceed by estimating DSGE-VARs for values of ¸ between 0:25, i.e., large prior
variance of the misspeciﬁcation matrices Ψ∆ and Σ∆, and 5, i.e., small potential misspeciﬁ-
cation.7 Importantly, ¸ is in principle a continuous parameter. However, for computational
convenience we consider only values of ¸ lying on a grid. Speciﬁcally, the values of ¸ we
consider are 0:25, :50, :75, 1, 1:50, 2, and 5. The subsequent results are based on p = 4 lags.
Table 2 describes the posterior of the misspeciﬁcation parameter ¸. The table reports log
marginal data densities for the directly estimated DSGE model and DSGE-VARs based on
diﬀerent values of ¸. Diﬀerences of log marginal densities across model speciﬁcations can
be interpreted as log posterior odds, under the assumption that the prior odds are equal to
one. The odds reported in the last column of Table 2 are relative to ¸ = 0:75, which is the
speciﬁcation with the largest marginal data density and, according to this likelihood-based
criterion, the best ﬁt. The posterior of ¸ has an inverted U-shape. There is little variation
in the marginal data densities for ¸ values between 0:50 and 2, whereas values outside of
this interval lead to a substantial deterioration in ﬁt. We conclude that over the range of the
historical sample the DSGE model is strongly dominated by DSGE-VARs with intermediate
7In principle ¸ ranges from
(k+n)
T to 1, where ¸ = 1 corresponds to the estimation of the VAR
approximation of the DSGE model. However, we found that the loss for ¸ = 5 is already close to that
computed under the DSGE model, hence we do not consider higher values.
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policy predictions should be interpreted with care.
Table 3 compares the posterior means of the structural parameters obtained from the
estimation of DSGE-VAR speciﬁcations for various values of ¸. The DSGE-VAR generates
Bayesian instrumental variable estimates of the policy rule parameters Ã1, Ã2, and ½R.
For large values of ¸ the instruments are very similar to the scores of the DSGE models’
likelihood function. For values of ¸ near zero the instruments essentially correspond to
lagged values of interest rates, inﬂation, and output growth. While the estimates of Ã2 and
½R are fairly insensitive to the choice of ¸, the estimate of the inﬂation coeﬃcient rises from
1.43 to 1.99 as the prior variance of the discrepancies Ψ∆ and Σ∆ increases. As shown in
Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) the estimates of the remaining DSGE model coeﬃcients
can be interpreted as minimum distance estimates, in which the estimator of Ψ is projected
onto the restricted subspace generated by Ψ¤(µ).
6.2 Policy Analysis
Based on the parameter estimates we calculate expected policy losses. The loss is based on
Eq. (41) where the weighting matrix W is diagonal with elements 1
4 (interest rates, annual-
ized), 1 (inﬂation, annualized), and 1
4 (output growth, quarter-to-quarter). Our weight on
output growth is somewhat larger than in Woodford (2003, Table 6.1) reﬂecting a larger
estimate of ·. Moreover, we place considerable weight on the nominal interest rate, which
could be justiﬁed by a large interest elasticity of money demand and an important role of
real money balances for transactions. The upper bound B of the loss is set to 50, which is
more than 20 times larger than the weighted sample variance of the three series. As a basis
for comparison, the variances of annualized output growth, inﬂation, and interest rates are
approximately 5, 2, and 6 percent respectively.
We evaluate the expected loss as a function of all the parameters characterizing the
Taylor rule (17): Ã1 and Ã2, the central bank’s response to inﬂation and output, respectively,
and ½R, the interest rate smoothing parameter. Speciﬁcally, we compute the expected loss
for each point of a three dimensional grid. In this grid, Ã1 takes 11 diﬀerent values obtained
by equally subdividing the interval [1:1;2:5]; Ã2 takes 6 diﬀerent values obtained by equally
subdividing the interval [0;1], and ½r takes 5 diﬀerent values obtained by equally subdividing
the interval [0;0:8]. The results are summarized in Figures 2 and 3. Both ﬁgures depict
expected loss diﬀerentials relative to the benchmark Ã1 = 1:8, Ã2 = 0:4, ½R = 0:8. The
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estimates of the parameters. Negative diﬀerentials indicate an improvement relative to the
benchmark. Figure 2 is a three-dimensional plot showing the expected loss as a function
of Ã1 and Ã2 with ½R ﬁxed at the benchmark value 0:8. Figure 3 depicts a slice of this
three-dimensional plot, obtained by further ﬁxing Ã2 to its benchmark value of 0:4.
Every ﬁgure contains four charts, one for each of the scenarios described in Section 4.2.
Scenario 1 shows the loss diﬀerential computed according to the state-space representation
of the DSGE model. For Scenarios 2 trough 4, the charts display the results obtained from
the DSGE-VAR for values of ¸ equal to 0:25, :50, :75, 1, 1:50, 2, and 5. Surfaces (or lines,
in case of Figure 3) have colors ranging from very light grey for ¸ equal to :25 to black
for ¸ equal to 5, with the darkness of the surface being directly proportional to ¸, that is,
inversely proportional to the amount of misspeciﬁcation.
In Scenario 1 the policymaker calculates the policy loss with the DSGE model, ignoring
misspeciﬁcation. Figure 2 shows that the loss decreases as the value of Ã1 increases, re-
gardless of the value of Ã2. The increase in the response of interest rates to inﬂation in the
Taylor rule results in a drop of inﬂation variability, which in turn implies a lower volatility
of interest rates as well. The drop in the loss is particularly steep as Ã1 increases from 1:1 to
1:5, but ﬂattens thereafter, as can be appreciated from the two dimensional plot in Figure 2.
While Figure 2 reports only the expected loss diﬀerential, we also computed (but did not
display) 90 percent probability bands in order to characterize the dispersion in the distri-
bution. These bands show that there is substantial uncertainty regarding the magnitude of
the drop in the loss when Ã1 increases from 1:1 to 1:5, but very little uncertainty in the loss
diﬀerential for values of Ã1 larger than 1:5.
The loss diﬀerential increases as Ã2 varies from 0 to 1. The higher variance of output
resulting from a low response in the Taylor rule is more than out-weighted by the lower
variability of inﬂation and the interest rate. Overall, the changes in loss as a function of
Ã2 are roughly one order of magnitude smaller than those resulting from changes in Ã1: in
Figure 2 the surface looks nearly ﬂat along the Ã2 dimension. For the sake of brevity we do
not show how the loss diﬀerential changes as a function of ½R. We ﬁnd that for all Scenarios
the optimal value of ½R is essentially determined by the value of Ã1, and independent from
Ã2. For low values of Ã1 it is optimal to have very low interest rate persistence (½R = 0). For
high values of Ã1 it is optimal to make the interest rate process very persistent (½R = 0:8).
In conclusion, the policy analysis conducted using the DSGE model suggests that the policy
maker should choose high values of Ã1 and low values of Ã2, although quantitatively the
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about the misspeciﬁcation parameter ¸ in Table 2 casts some doubts on the reliability of
DSGE model predictions, however. Hence we move to take potential misspeciﬁcation into
account.
In Scenario 2 the policymaker still uses the DSGE model to compute the mean response
of the endogenous variables to the change in the policy parameters, but recognizes that
“nature” may be injecting noise around these mean responses using the prior distribution.
Under this scenario the policymaker learns from the data about the overall amount of noise
(¸) but refuses to learn about the precise nature of the misspeciﬁcation: She therefore uses
the prior to generate draws of Ψ∆ and Σ∆ rather than the posterior. Again, dark shades
of grey in Figure 2 correspond to a small amount of noise (large values of ¸), whereas
lighter shades of grey are associated with a larger variance of the noise (small values of
¸). Not surprisingly when the misspeciﬁcation is small (say, ¸ = 5) the shape of the loss
does not change substantially relative to Scenario 1. But as the amount of misspeciﬁcation
increases the loss proﬁle becomes ﬂatter. In particular, the large drop in the expected loss
diﬀerential that characterized the increase in Ã1 from 1:1 to 1:5 under the DSGE model
nearly disappears under Scenario 2 with low values of ¸, as can be easily appreciated from
Figure 3.
Under the DSGE model the mechanics of the rational expectations equilibrium imply
that high values of Ã1 help to anchor inﬂationary expectations. Since in equilibrium inﬂation
moves less than under low values of Ã1, interest rates need to move less as well. The presence
of substantial misspeciﬁcation changes these dynamic responses. A decomposition of the loss
into its three components indicates that for small values of ¸ interest rate variability actually
rises as the central bank responds more strongly to inﬂation, albeit slightly. However this
rise is roughly oﬀ-set by the drop in inﬂation variability. The overall minimum for the loss
diﬀerential is still achieved for high values of Ã1 and low values in Ã2, as in Scenario 1.
But the most important policy implication under Scenario 1, namely to stay away from low
values of Ã1, loses much of its strength under the misspeciﬁcation considered in Scenario 2.
In Scenario 3 the policymaker uses sample information to learn about the precise nature
of misspeciﬁcation, unlike in the previous scenario. In addition, she believes that the histor-
ically observed discrepancies Ψ∆ and Σ∆ are policy invariant. Figure 2 shows that under
this Scenario the loss surface is quite diﬀerent than under Scenarios 1 and 2 whenever the
amount of misspeciﬁcation is non-negligible. First of all, there is much more curvature with
respect to Ã2. Second, the loss proﬁle is no longer strictly decreasing in Ã1 for values of ¸
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function of Ã1, with the minimum attained at the value of roughly 1:8.
In order to understand this ﬁnding, it is useful to look at Figure 4, which shows under
each scenario the fraction of draws for which either the linearized DSGE model does not
have a unique stable rational expectations solution (indeterminacy) or the resulting vector
autoregressive system is explosive (explosiveness). The ﬁgure shows that this fraction is
virtually zero under Scenario 1 (of course here only indeterminacy is possible), very small
under Scenarios 2 and 4, but quite large under Scenario 3 particularly for small values of
¸. This is particularly true for large values of Ã2, but also for either small or large values
of Ã1. Speciﬁcally, the fraction increases the further we move away from the estimated
policy parameters, which roughly coincide with the benchmark. In Scenario 3 this fraction
is mainly composed by draws that generate explosiveness, rather than indeterminacy.
To see why this happens, recall that the estimated VAR parameters ˆ Ψ can be decom-
posed into the sum of the parameters implied by the DSGE restrictions Ψ¤(µ) and of the
misspeciﬁcation Ψ∆. Roughly speaking, under Scenario 3, the new set of VAR parameters
is computed as the sum of Ψ¤(˜ µ), which changes with policy, and Ψ∆, which is assumed to
be invariant. If the policy parameters are close to estimated ones, the sum of Ψ¤(˜ µ) and Ψ∆
returns the estimated VAR parameters, which generally do not have explosive roots. But as
we move away from the estimated policy parameters, for small values of ¸ the sum of Ψ¤(˜ µ)
and Ψ∆ often delivers new VAR parameters whose roots are explosive. Whenever ¸ is large,
however, Ψ∆ is negligible and the new VAR parameters roughly coincide with Ψ¤(˜ µ), which
is non explosive. Hence, for small ¸ the policy recommendation under Scenario 3 implies
that the policymaker should not stray away too much from the estimated policy parameters,
for this increases the risk of encountering explosive behavior when the misspeciﬁcation is
large. Cogley and Sargent (2005) also present results where the policy recommendation
coming from their model is largely driven by the concern for explosiveness. However, not
all deviations from the estimated policy parameters matter equally: i) changes in Ã2 matter
more than changes in Ã1, and ii) decreases in Ã2 are far less harmful than increases.
Finally, under Scenario 4 the policymaker again uses sample information to learn about
potential model misspeciﬁcation. Unlike in Scenario 3, the policymaker now asks the ques-
tion: What would the estimates of the discrepancies Ψ∆ and Σ∆ be if the new policy had
been in place during the sample period? Figure 2 shows that under this Scenario the loss
surface is similar to that computed under Scenarios 2. Namely, when the misspeciﬁcation is
small (say, ¸ = 5) the shape of the loss does not change substantially relative to Scenario 1.
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from Figure 4, explosiveness is no longer an overriding concern in Scenario 4, as it was
in Scenario 3. The reason for this result is that now as ˜ µ changes both Ψ¤(˜ µ) and Ψ∆(˜ µ)
change in such a way that the sum of the two is not too diﬀerent from the estimated VAR
parameters. Indeed, for very small values of ¸ the dynamics for all equations other than the
Taylor rule are approximately independent of the policy parameters. This explains why the
loss surface is nearly ﬂat whenever the misspeciﬁcation is high.
At this point we have no theory that lets us determine which of the scenarios will provide
the most accurate prediction of the policy eﬀects. We show that the results of the policy
analysis depend on: (i) whether the policymaker relies on the data to assess the degree of
misspeciﬁcations, i.e., learns about ¸; and (ii) the assumption she makes on the process
driving the discrepancies between the DSGE model and the data in the aftermath of the
policy intervention. According to our analysis, the risks associated with straying away from
the historical policy parameters are very diﬀerent depending on both the overall size of
the misspeciﬁcation and the assumptions on how the nature of the misspeciﬁcation changes
with policy. Nevertheless, a fairly robust policy recommendation emerges from our analysis:
the central bank should avoid strong responses to output growth movements and not react
weakly to inﬂation ﬂuctuations.
The results in Figures 2 and 3 depend on the somewhat arbitrary choice of the bound.
For this reason, we have recomputed all ﬁgures using a bound that is double (100) or
ten times larger (500) than the one used so far. Although the loss diﬀerentials change
substantially with the bound, particularly in Scenario 3, we ﬁnd that the the overall shape
of the contours, and hence the gist of our conclusions, stay roughly the same.
Finally, Figure 5 compares the loss diﬀerentials that we just analyzed with those ob-
tained under the risk-sensitive version of our problem. For each scenario the Figure shows
the risk-sensitive loss (black) as well as the risk-neutral loss (light grey). For Scenarios 2
through 4 the loss-diﬀerentials are computed for ¸ equal to 0:75 (best-ﬁtting model). A
caveat of our analysis so far is that we do not distinguish between uncertainty in the deep
parameters µ and in the misspeciﬁcation parameters Ψ∆ and Σ∆. In principle we want to
be robust gains the latter, but not necessarily the former.
For Scenario 1, where the risk-sensitivity is only with respect to the deep parameters µs,
we ﬁnd that the risk sensitive loss is generally not too diﬀerent from the plain-vanilla one.
The only major diﬀerence is that risk-sensitivity suggests to stay away from low values of
Ã2. These are the values that minimize the risk-neutral loss . In Scenario 2, risk-sensitivity
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sensitivity re-instates the large drop in loss related to increasing Ã1 from 1:1 to 1:5, which
in absence of risk-sensitivity is no longer there for ¸ = :75. In Scenario 3 the surface is
much ﬂatter under the risk-sensitive loss than under the expected loss. Tentatively, we
explain this ﬁnding as follows: for most grid-points there is a non-negligible probability
of encountering explosive draws. A perverse “nature” would tilt the distribution precisely
toward this outcome. Hence, under Scenario 3, the policy maker is “doomed no-matter-
what.” Lastly, also under Scenario 4 the slope is ﬂatter under risk-sensitivity than under the
expected loss. While so far Scenarios 2 and 4 have looked fairly similar, under risk-sensitivity
the two scenarios deliver very diﬀerent implications. In particular, Scenario 4 suggests that
the risk-sensitive policymaker should choose low values of Ã1 (and Ã2), although the loss
diﬀerential is not very large.
7 Conclusion
Current DSGE models are to some extent misspeciﬁed, even large-scale models such as
the one in Smets and Wouters (2003). While they allow policymakers to assess the eﬀects
of rare policy changes on the expectation formation and decision rules of private agents,
their ﬁt is typically worse than the ﬁt of alternative econometric models, such as VARs
estimated with well-calibrated shrinkage methods. The DSGE-VARs studied in Del Negro
and Schorfheide (2004) and Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004) provide a
framework that allows researchers to account for model misspeciﬁcation. In this paper we
developed techniques to conduct policy analysis with potentially misspeciﬁed DSGE models
and applied them to a New Keynesian DSGE model with capital accumulation and several
real and nominal frictions. We studied the eﬀect of changing the response to inﬂation under
an ad-hoc loss function that penalizes inﬂation, output growth, and interest rate variability.
We view our framework as an attractive alternative to robust control approaches to model
misspeciﬁcation that deserves to be explored in future research.
We ﬁnd that the particular values of the loss diﬀerentials are sensitive to the misspec-
iﬁcation assumptions considered. Both the risks and the gains associated with deviating
from the historical Volcker-Greenspan policy are very diﬀerent depending on the assump-
tions on misspeciﬁcation. Also, risks and gains diﬀer whether the policy maker uses the
risk-neutral or the risk-sensitive approach. However, a fairly robust policy recommendation
emerges from our analysis: the central bank should avoid strong responses to output growth
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April 2005movements and not react weakly to inﬂation ﬂuctuations. Also, we ﬁnd that the gains
associated with deviating from the historical Volcker-Greenspan policy, whenever positive,
are generally not very large. This suggests that the historical rule, if not always optimal
among those we consider, has been reasonably good at least from the perspective of this
sticky-prices DSGE model, even taking misspeciﬁcation into account.
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A.1 Draws from the Posterior
We adopt the notation that ˜ Y (µ) = Y ¡ XB1(µ) which leads to the deﬁnitions
Γ˜ Y ˜ Y = ΓY Y ¡ ΓY XB1(µ) ¡ B1(µ)0ΓXY ¡ B1(µ)0ΓXXB1(µ); ΓX ˜ Y = ΓXY ¡ ΓXXB1(µ):
Let etr[A] = exp[¡1






Y ¡ X(B1(µ) + ΨB2(µ))
¶0µ
Y ¡ X(B1(µ) + ΨB2(µ))
¶¸
:
Using Lemma 1(i) we can rewrite the prior mean of Ψ as
Ψ¤(µ) = ¯ Ψ(Σ;µ) = Γ
¡1
XX(µ)ΓX ˜ Y (µ)Σ¡1B0
2(µ)[B2(µ)Σ¡1B0
2(µ)]¡1:










The prior density for Σ is given by






To simplify notation the (µ)-argument of the functions B1, B2, ˜ Y , ΓXY , ΓXX, and ΓY Y is
omitted.
Conditional Posterior of Ψ: Combining the the prior density (A.2) with the likelihood
function (A.1) yields
p(ΨjΣ;µ;Y )





ΓY Y ¡ 2B0
2Ψ0ΓX ˜ Y + B0
2Ψ0ΓXX(µ)ΨB2
¶











˜ Ψ(Σ;µ) = (¸TΓXX + X0X)¡1(¸TΓX ˜ Y + X0 ˜ Y )Σ¡1B0
2(B2Σ¡1B0
2)¡1:
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likelihood function (A.1) yields









¸T(Γ˜ Y ˜ Y ¡ Γ˜ Y XΓ
¡1
XXΓX ˜ Y ) + (˜ Y ¡ XΨB2)0(˜ Y ¡ XΨB2)
¶
+¸T(B2Σ¡1B0
2)(Ψ ¡ ¯ Ψ)0ΓXX(Ψ ¡ ¯ Ψ)
¸
:






























¸TΓ˜ Y ˜ Y + ˜ Y 0 ˜ Y ¡ 2B0














If the DSGE model satisﬁes Eq. (23) and the error u1;t is orthogonal to xt then





X ˜ Y Γ
¡1
XXΓX ˜ Y = 0: (A.8)
While the conditional posterior distribution of Σ given our prior distribution is not of
the IW form use an IW distribution as proposal distribution in a Metropolis-Hastings step.
Deﬁne
˜ S(Ψ;µ) = ¸TΓ˜ Y ˜ Y + ˜ Y 0 ˜ Y ¡ (¸TΓX ˜ Y + X0 ˜ Y )0ΨB2 ¡ B0
2Ψ0(¸TΓX ˜ Y + X0 ˜ Y ) (A.9)
+B0
2Ψ0(¸TΓXX + X0X)ΨB2
Our proposal distribution for Σ is
IW(˜ S(Ψ;µ);(¸ + 1)T;n):
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proportional to the joint density of Y , Ψ, Σ, and µ, which we can evaluate numerically since
the normalization constants for p(ΨjΣ;µ) and p(Σjµ) are readily available.
p(µjΨ;Σ;Y ) / p(Y;Ψ;Σ;µ) = p(Y jΨ;Σ;µ)p(ΨjΣ;µ)p(Σjµ)p(µ): (A.10)
To obtain a proposal density for p(µjΨ;Σ;Y ) we (i) maximize the posterior density of the
DSGE model with respect to µ and (ii) calculate the inverse Hessian at the mode, denoted
by V¯ µ;DSGE. (iii) We then use a random-walk Metropolis step with proposal density
N(µ(s¡1);cV¯ µ;DSGE)
where µ(s¡1) is the value of µ drawn in iteration s ¡ 1 of the MCMC algorithm, and c is a
scaling factor that can be used to control the rejection rate in the Metropolis step.
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Parameter Prior Posterior
Mean Stdd Mean 90% Interval
Ã1 1.500 0.250 1.433 1.131 1.770
Ã2 0.125 0.100 0.361 0.102 0.596
½r 0.500 0.200 0.834 0.800 0.869
r¤
a 1.000 1.000 0.577 0.000 1.298
¼¤
a 3.000 2.000 4.602 3.085 6.073
°a 2.000 1.000 1.945 1.358 2.518
h 0.800 0.100 0.987 0.979 0.997
ºl 2.000 0.750 2.464 1.131 3.684
³w 0.750 0.100 0.721 0.538 0.957
³p 0.750 0.100 0.794 0.725 0.868
s0 4.000 1.500 6.274 3.734 8.725
a0 0 0.200 0.075 0.225 0.109 0.332
g¤ 0.150 0.050 0.131 0.057 0.200
½g 0.800 0.050 0.904 0.867 0.943
¾z 0.400 2.000 2.086 1.234 2.958
¾g 0.300 2.000 0.551 0.470 0.634
¾r 0.200 2.000 0.142 0.121 0.162
Notes: The table reports prior means and standard deviations, and posterior means and
90 percent probability intervals for the estimated parameters. See Section 2 for a deﬁnition
of the DSGE model’s parameters, and Section 5 for a description of the data. We are
reporting annualized values for ¼¤, r¤, and ° (a-subscript). The following parameters were
ﬁxed: ® = 0:25, ± = 0:025, ¶p = ¶w = 0, F = 0, ¸f = ¸w = 0:3, Â = 0, ºm = 2, ½z = 0. All
shocks other than ²z, ²R, ²g are equal to zero.
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Speciﬁcation lnp(Y ) Post Odds
DSGE Model -313.58 4E-11
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 5:0 -297.01 6E-04
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 2:0 -293.96 0.012
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 1:5 -292.83 0.039
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 1:0 -290.88 0.270
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = :75 -289.58 1.000
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = :50 -289.78 0.816
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = :25 -298.50 1E-04
Notes: The marginal data densities are obtained by integrating the likelihood function with
respect to the model parameters, weighted by the prior density conditional on ¸. The
diﬀerence of log marginal data densities can be interpreted as log posterior odds under the
assumption of that the two speciﬁcations have equal prior probabilities.
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Parameter Prior Mean Posterior Mean (¸)
0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 5.0 DSGE
Ã1 1.500 1.990 1.788 1.774 1.714 1.824 1.669 1.650 1.433
Ã2 0.125 0.275 0.278 0.263 0.259 0.285 0.296 0.315 0.361
½r 0.500 0.836 0.845 0.849 0.857 0.861 0.855 0.856 0.834
r¤
a 1.000 0.537 0.378 0.346 0.378 0.498 0.419 0.515 0.577
¼¤
a 3.000 3.596 3.392 3.442 3.431 3.782 3.704 3.980 4.602
°a 2.000 1.925 1.879 2.081 1.943 2.214 2.044 2.218 1.945
h 0.800 0.944 0.882 0.919 0.970 0.982 0.984 0.987 0.987
ºl 2.000 2.043 2.161 2.097 2.245 2.326 2.501 2.451 2.464
³w 0.750 0.726 0.728 0.732 0.755 0.727 0.739 0.745 0.721
³p 0.750 0.699 0.618 0.640 0.688 0.739 0.746 0.773 0.794
a0 0 0.200 0.204 0.203 0.220 0.207 0.197 0.214 0.208 0.225
s0 4.000 4.296 4.429 4.503 4.565 4.540 4.500 5.091 6.274
g¤ 0.150 0.149 0.158 0.139 0.142 0.141 0.142 0.136 0.131
½g 0.800 0.813 0.823 0.822 0.826 0.823 0.831 0.836 0.904
¾z 0.400 0.956 0.912 1.033 1.322 1.689 1.837 2.139 2.086
¾g 0.300 0.303 0.339 0.365 0.369 0.376 0.390 0.424 0.551
¾r 0.200 0.123 0.129 0.132 0.128 0.132 0.134 0.137 0.142
Notes: The table reports prior and posterior means for the DSGE-VAR as a function of ¸
and the DSGE model. See Section 2 for a deﬁnition of the DSGE model’s parameters, and
Section 5 for a description of the data. We are reporting annualized values for ¼¤, r¤, and
° (a-subscript). The following parameters were ﬁxed: ® = 0:25, ± = 0:025, ¶p = ¶w = 0,
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Notes: Φ = [Á1;Á2]0 can be interpreted as the VAR parameters, and Φ¤(µ) is the restriction
function implied by the DSGE model.
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Notes: Mean policy loss diﬀerentials as a function of Ã1 and Ã2 relative to baseline policy
rule Ã1 = 1:8, Ã2 = 0:4, ½R = 0:80. All numbers are computed ﬁxing the value of ½R at the
benchmark. Negative diﬀerentials signify an improvement relative to baseline rule. Scenario
1 shows the loss diﬀerential computed according to the DSGE model. Scenarios 2, 3 , and
4 (see section 4.2) take misspeciﬁcation into account. For Scenarios 2 through 4, the charts
display the results obtained for values of ¸ equal to 0:25, :50, :75, 1, 1:50, 2, and 5. Surfaces’
color ranges from very light grey (¸ = :25) to dark grey (¸ = 5), with the darkness of the
surface being directly proportional to ¸.
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April 2005Figure 3: Expected Policy Loss Differentials - As a function of Ã1












































Notes: Mean policy loss diﬀerentials as a function of Ã1 relative to baseline policy rule
Ã1 = 1:8, Ã2 = 0:4, ½R = 0:80. All numbers are computed ﬁxing the values of Ã2 and ½R
at the benchmark. Negative diﬀerentials signify an improvement relative to baseline rule.
Scenario 1 shows the loss diﬀerential computed according to the DSGE model. Scenarios 2,
3, and 4 (see section 4.2) take misspeciﬁcation into account. For Scenarios 2 through 4, the
charts display the results obtained for values of ¸ equal to 0:25, :50, :75, 1, 1:50, 2, and 5.
Surfaces’ color ranges from very light grey (¸ = :25) to dark grey (¸ = 5), with the darkness
of the surface being directly proportional to ¸.
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Notes: Fraction of draws for which either the linearized DSGE model does not have a unique
stable rational expectations solution (indeterminacy) or the resulting vector autoregressive
system is explosive (explosiveness), computed as a function of Ã1 and Ã2. All numbers are
computed ﬁxing the value of ½R at the benchmark. at the benchmark. Negative diﬀerentials
signify an improvement relative to baseline rule. Scenario 1 shows the loss diﬀerential
computed according to the DSGE model. Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 (see section 4.2) take
misspeciﬁcation into account. For Scenarios 2 through 4, the charts display the results
obtained for values of ¸ equal to 0:25, :50, :75, 1, 1:50, 2, and 5. Surfaces’ color ranges
from very light grey (¸ = :25) to dark grey (¸ = 5), with the darkness of the surface being
directly proportional to ¸.
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Notes: Policy loss diﬀerentials relative to baseline policy rule Ã1 = 1:8, Ã2 = 0:4, ½R = 0:80.
All numbers are computed ﬁxing the value of ½R at the benchmark. Negative diﬀerentials
signify an improvement relative to baseline rule. Scenario 1 shows the loss diﬀerential
computed according to the DSGE model. Scenarios 2, 3 , and 4 (see section 4.2) take
misspeciﬁcation into account. For each scenario, the expected loss diﬀerential is shown in
light grey, and the risk-sensitive loss diﬀerential in black.
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